Rethinking the Digital Humanities in the Context of Originary Technicity by Frabetti, Federica
 
 
CULTURE MACHINE                                                        VOL 12 r2011 
 
 
www.culturemachine.net r1  
 
 
 
 
 
RETHINKING THE DIGITAL HUMANITIES  
IN THE CONTEXT OF ORIGINARY TECHNICITY 
Federica Frabetti 
 
 
 
There seems to be a vague sense among digital humanities scholars 
that this emerging field should be concerned with, and engaged in, 
thinking the humanities differently. However, there is no significant 
agreement about what this might actually mean.1
 
 Is the encounter 
between the humanities and digitality sufficient to make the 
humanitites ‘different’, or ‘new’? In what sense would digitality bring 
about something ‘new’ in the humanities, and what implications 
would this have for the way in which the humanities are practiced in 
the academy? Alan Liu, among others, has raised questions for such 
a search for novelty or ‘new beginnings’ in academic disciplines (Liu, 
2008: 4). In his book of 2008 entitled Local Transcendence he 
understands the chase for ‘the new or innovative in business, 
technology, media, art fashion’, and (we may add) in academic 
disciplines, as a feature of the postindustrial Western sense of 
temporality – a ‘sense of loose beginnings and loose ends’ (1). 
Liu also points out how the logic of management and flexibility has 
infiltrated the digital humanities and how, by making the 
transmission of academic knowledge more efficient and flexible, 
many humanities computing projects ‘enrol the humanities and arts 
in the techno-logic of discourse network 2000’ (211).2 He suggests 
that the digital humanities resist efficiency by way of ‘their own 
values’: ‘while the technological measure of the new discourse 
paradigm is postindustrial efficiency coupled with flexibility, that is, 
the ability to say anything to anyone quickly, the measure of 
academic knowledge is also historical, social, philosophical, artistic, 
and public (non-proprietary) diversity, for example, the ability to say 
anything to anyone fully, richly, openly, differently, kindly, or slowly’ 
(211). However, what I want to call into question in this article is 
precisely the idea that the humanities traditionally rest on a clearly 
identifiable set of common values, neatly distinguishable from – and 
even opposed to – technological concepts. After all, have not the 
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humanities always been concerned with technology, at least to some 
extent? Is not access to every text always already mediated by 
technology (such as, e.g.,  by writing)? In order to explain this point 
better, let me start from outlining the understanding of the 
relationship between computation and the humanities as advanced 
by Johanna Drucker in her 2009 book, SpecLab.  
 
In this book Drucker warns the humanities against the premise of 
objectivity embodied by computational methodologies. For her, the 
infatuation of the humanities with computation falls within the 
tradition of mathesis universalis, with its aspiration to the 
reconciliation of natural and mathematical languages fostered by the 
intellectual assumptions of British analytical philosophy and those of 
the Vienna Circle, as well as by structural linguistics and its legacy 
(Drucker, 2009: 4). By contrast, Drucker proposes the concept of 
‘speculative computing’ as a way ‘to push back on the cultural 
authority by which computational methods instrumentalize their 
effects across many disciplines’ (5). 
 
I therefore want to advance here a different (although perhaps 
complementary) proposition – namely, that computation and the 
humanities cannot be thought as two separate entities whose 
relations can be defined once and for all, and that the digital 
humanities might need to keep the very question of the relations 
between the humanities and digitality (and perhaps, more broadly, 
between the human and the technological) open. In fact, the ability 
to question inherited conceptual frameworks regarding technology 
might be one of the digital humanities’ points of strength, which is 
pivotal to the production of new knowledge.  
 
In order to do so, a good starting point for thinking about the digital 
humanities could be the re-examination of the philosophical 
conceptions of technology. Indeed, as Bernard Stiegler remarks, 
Western philosophy has always found it rather difficult to think 
about technology. In the first volume of his book Technics and Time 
(1998a), Stiegler points out how, while the extraordinary 
technological changes of our age need to be conceptualized and 
made intelligible as soon as possible, in attempting to achieve this 
intelligibility one cannot rely on any available account of technology 
in the Western philosophical tradition: ‘at its very origin and up until 
now, philosophy has repressed technics as an object of thought. 
Technics is the unthought’ (Stiegler, 1998a: ix).3 Although later on 
in his work Stiegler identifies a few exceptions to this philosophical 
refusal to openly approach technology – namely, the thought of 
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several French philosophers, including Jacques Derrida, and that of 
Martin Heidegger – he nevertheless points out that philosophical 
reflection has traditionally pushed technology to its own margins. 
And yet, a critical evaluation of such reflection shows how the 
concept of technology has always been tightly connected to the 
concepts of ‘knowledge’, ‘language’ and ‘humanity’.  
 
Tracing a map of the philosophical thought on technology is not an 
easy task. In order to start exploring this problem, let me follow for a 
moment the innovative genealogy proposed by Stiegler (1998a). 
Stiegler’s position on the relationship between philosophy and 
technology is quite striking. Although, as we have seen above, he 
argues for the ‘urgency and necessity of an encounter between 
philosophy and technology’ (1998a: xi), he actually views 
philosophy as traditionally and constitutively incapable of thinking 
technology. For him philosophy has always ‘repressed’ technology as 
an object of thought. Even more significantly, from the very 
beginning Western philosophy has distinguished itself from 
technology, and has in fact identified itself as not technology. It has 
done so by separating technê from epistêmê. Epistêmê is the Greek 
word most often translated as knowledge, while technê is translated 
as either craft or art (Parry, 2003). The separation between technê 
and epistêmê was rooted in the political arena of fifth century Athens, 
and it associated technê with the rhetorical skills of the Sophists. As 
professional rhetoricians, the Sophists were skilled in the 
construction of political arguments. Their skillfulness (technê) was 
perceived as indifference to establishing truth, or, worse, as an 
attempt to make truth instrumental to power. As such, Sophists’ 
technê came to be opposed to true knowledge. Therefore, truth 
remained the only object of epistêmê, which in turn was identified 
with philosophy. This substantially political move deprived 
technical knowledge of any value. 
 
Stiegler emphasizes that the subsequent step in the devaluation of 
technology was made by Aristotle through his definition of a 
‘technical being’ as a being that does not have an end in itself and 
that is just a tool used by someone else for their ends.4
 
 In other 
words, the exclusion of technology from philosophy has been 
founded on the concept of instrumentality: technical knowledge has 
been interpreted as instrumental, and therefore as non-philosophy. 
To quote Timothy Clark (2000), ‘the conception of technology that 
has dominated Western thought for almost three thousand years’ 
can be synthesised as follows: 
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The traditional, Aristotelian view is that 
technology is extrinsic to human nature as a tool 
which is used to bring about certain ends. 
Technology is applied science, an instrument of 
knowledge. The inverse of this conception, now 
commonly heard, is that the instrument has taken 
control of its maker, the creation control of its 
creator (Frankenstein’s monster). (Clark, 2000: 
238) 
 
Thus, the utilitarian model of technology which is still in use today 
has its foundations in Aristotelian thought. Moreover, as Stiegler 
maintains, instrumentality has gained a new importance during the 
process of the industrialization of the Western world. Accordingly, 
technology has slowly acquired a new place in philosophical 
thought. Science has in fact become more and more instrumental 
(to economy, to war) in the course of the last two centuries, 
therefore gradually renouncing its character of ‘pure’ knowledge. At 
the same time, philosophy has become interested in the 
‘technicization’ of science. An example of this is Edmund Husserl’s 
work on the arithmeticization of geometry.5
 
 
Importantly, as Stiegler also points out, the Platonic conception of 
technicization as the loss of memory is still at the basis of Husserl’s 
understanding of algebra (1998a: 3). I will come back to Plato’s 
understanding of technology in a moment. For now it is worth 
remembering that in his dialogue Phaedrus, Plato famously 
associates writing, understood as a technique to aid memory, with 
the loss of true memory, which for Plato is anamnesis, or recollection 
of an ideal truth. From this perspective, which again separates 
knowledge from technology, writing is devalued because of its 
instrumentality.6
 
  
To recapitulate the above argument, the devaluation of technology 
in Western philosophy goes hand in hand with the devaluation of 
writing. What I want to argue here is that the relationship 
established by Stiegler between technology and writing as both 
excluded by knowledge and encompassed by the concept of 
instrumentality assumes a particular importance in the context of 
the digital humanities. The question to be posed at this point is: if 
digital technologies exceed and destabilize the concept of 
instrumentality, do they not also destabilize the concept of writing? 
And what would the consequences of such a destabilization be for 
the digital humanities?  
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In order to develop this point, let me now turn to the alternative 
tradition of thought on technology that, again according to Stiegler, 
starts with Heidegger and is not based on the concept of 
instrumentality. Clark (2000) calls this the tradition of ‘originary 
technicity’ – a term he borrows from Richard Beardsworth (1996). 
This term assumes a paradoxical character only if one remains 
situated within the instrumental conceptualisation of technology: if 
technology were instrumental, it could not be originary – that is, 
constitutive of the human. Therefore, the concept of ‘originary 
technicity’ resists the utilitarian conception of technology. To clarify 
what he means by ‘originary technicity’, Clark refers to the 1992 
novel, The Turing Option, co-authored by Marvin Minsky, a leading 
theorist in the field of Artificial Intelligence (Harry and Minsky, 
1992). In order to regain his cognitive capacities after a shooting 
accident has severely damaged his brain, the protagonist of the 
novel, Brian Delaney, has a small computer implanted into his skull 
as a prosthesis. After the surgery he starts reconstructing the 
knowledge he had before the shooting. The novel shows him trying 
to catch up with himself through his former notes and getting an 
intense feeling that the self that wrote those notes in the past is lost 
forever. Clark uses this story as a brilliant figuration of the fact that 
no self-consciousness can be reached without technology: 
 
Delaney’s experience in The Turing Option is only 
different in degree from the normal working of 
the mind from minute to minute ... No thinking – 
no interiority of the psyche – can be conceived 
apart from technics in the guise of systems of signs 
which it may seem to employ but which are a 
condition of its own identity. (Clark, 2000: 240) 
 
This passage draws on the understanding of ‘technics’ not in terms 
of massive engineering works but as ‘the subtler intimacy of the 
relation of technology to human thinking’, and especially as ‘the 
intimacy between technology and language’ (Clark, 2000: 240). 
Such an understanding of technology ostensibly borrows from 
Heidegger’s thought, as well from that of Derrida and Stiegler. What 
Clark (2000) calls ‘originary technicity’, Stiegler in turn names 
‘originary prostheticity’ of the human (Stiegler, 1998a: 98-100). To 
understand this point better, it is helpful to examine briefly Stiegler’s 
essay, ‘The Time of Cinema’, as well as the third volume of Technics 
and Time, in particular the section where, in dialogue with Derrida, 
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he reworks Husserl’s philosophy of time (Stiegler, 1998b, 2001a, 
2003a). 
 
Stiegler’s philosophy of technology is based on the central premise 
that ‘the human has always been technological’ (Hansen, 2003: non-
pag.). Stiegler draws here on the work of the French paleontologist 
André Leroi-Gourhan, who tightly connects the appearance of the 
human with tool use. For Stiegler, too, the human co-emerges with 
tool use. He writes: 
 
Humans die but their histories remain – this is the 
big difference between mankind and other life 
forms. Among these traces most have in fact not 
been produced with a view to transmitting 
memories: a piece of pottery or a tool were not 
made to transmit any memory but they do so 
nevertheless, spontaneously. Which is why 
archaeologists are looking for them: they are often 
the only witnesses of the most ancient episodes. 
Other traces are specifically devoted to the 
transmission of memory, for example writing, 
photography, phonography and cinematography. 
(Stiegler, 2003a: non-pag.)7
 
 
For Stiegler technology carries traces of past events. In Mark 
Hansen’s words, it is ‘the support for the inscription of memory’ 
(Hansen, 2003: non-pag.) – that is, technology is always a memory 
aid, and only through memory do human beings gain access to their 
own past, and therefore become aware of themselves, or gain 
consciousness. Any technical instrument registers and transmits the 
memory of its use. For instance, a carved stone used as a knife 
preserves the act of cutting, thus becoming a support for memory. In 
this sense, technology is the condition of the constitution of our 
relation to the past. In sum, it can be said that human beings 
‘exteriorize’ their memory into technological objects, which in turn 
are nothing but memory exteriorized. Importantly, by doing this the 
human species becomes able to suspend its genetic program and to 
evolve through means other than animal instincts –that is, in 
Stiegler’s words, to ‘pursue life through means other than life’ 
(Stiegler, 1998a: 17). Stiegler gives the name of ‘epiphylogenesis’ to 
this process (2003a: non-pag). Epiphylogenesis is the 
transformation and evolution of the human species through its 
relationship with technology, rather than only on the basis of its 
genetic program. Furthermore, by functioning as a support for 
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memory, a technical object for Stiegler ‘forms the condition for the 
givenness of time in any concrete situation’ (Hansen, 2003: non-
pag.). For this reason, Stiegler maintains that human beings can 
experience themselves only through technology.8
 
 
However, Stiegler’s reflections on originary technicity cannot be 
transferred into the digital humanities uncritically. The main 
question that needs to be addressed here is the distinction operated 
by Stiegler between technics and mnemotechnics. Although 
‘technics is always a memory aid, ‘not every technics is a mnemo-
technics. The first mnemotechnical systems appear after the 
Neolithic period. They form what will later become the kind of 
writing we are still using today’ (Stiegler, 2003a: non-pag.). For 
Stiegler every technics (for instance, pottery) carries the memory of 
a past experience; but only mnemotechnics (for instance, writing) 
are conceived with the primary purpose of carrying the memory of a 
past experience. In Stiegler’s argument, the emphasis is on the aim, 
or end, of different technologies: some technologies are conceived 
just for recording, others are not. 
 
At this point I want to advance the following proposition: digitality 
(as evident in particular in software-based technologies) 
transgresses Stiegler’s distinction between technics and 
mnemotechnics. Although this thesis needs to be investigated 
further, it is important to position it first of all as a problem. If one 
relies on the widely accepted definition of software that constitutes 
the foundation of Software Engineering, one finds that ‘software’ is 
the totality of all computer programs as well as all the written texts 
related to computer programs (Humphrey, 1989; Sommerville, 
1995). To give but one example, Ian Sommerville writes that 
‘software engineers model parts of the real world in software. These 
models are large, abstract and complex so they must be made visible 
in documents such as system designs, user manuals, and so on. 
Producing these documents is as much part of the software 
engineering process as programming’ (Sommerville, 1995: 4).9 
According to this definition, software can be thought of as a totality 
of ‘documents’ or ‘texts’ written in natural and formal languages at 
every stage of software development. Thus, software can be 
considered – in Stiegler’s terms – as mnemotechnics. On the other 
hand, it cannot be said that the main purpose of software is 
recording in the same way that it is for writing or cinema. It could be 
argued that the main purpose of software is to make things happen 
in the world (for instance, to change the polarities of the electronic 
circuits within a computer on which software is executed). This is 
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why software might be the point where Stiegler’s distinction 
between technics and mnemotechnics is suspended.10
 
  
But, if digitality calls into question the distinction between technics 
and mnemotechnics, how is one supposed to think digitality within 
the framework of originary technicity? And, even more importantly, 
does not digitality call into question also the concept of writing on 
which the humanities have been traditionally based? If so, can 
digital technologies be considered purely instrumental to the digital 
humanities, or do the digital humanities need to rethink the very 
concept of instrumentality in relation to digitality and writing? To 
explain this point better, it is worth returning to Clark and to his 
claim that the thinkers of originary technicity situate the question of 
technology ‘in the subtle intimacy’ of the relation between 
technology and language (2000: 240). Indeed, according to Clark, 
Jacques Derrida is one of the most important thinkers of originary 
technicity precisely because he ‘takes on the radical consequences of 
conceiving technical objects (including systems of signs) as having a 
mode of being that resists being totally understood in terms of some 
posited function or purpose for human being’ (2000: 240). By his 
refusal to explain either technology or language in instrumental, 
functionalist terms, Derrida resists the widespread denigration of 
the ‘merely’ technical in Western thought.  
 
Famously, Derrida makes references to technology and to the 
importance of technicity for the definition of the human throughout 
his whole work. Importantly, his conception of technology as 
something that cannot be understood within the conceptual 
framework of instrumentality is inseparable from his understanding 
of writing. Actually Derrida traces the devaluation of instrumentality 
back to the famous devaluation of writing that I have examined 
earlier on in Plato’s Phaedrus (Derrida, 1981). For Derrida, as for 
Stiegler, the devaluation of instrumentality cannot be separated 
from the devaluation of writing.  
 
Derrida’s reflection on writing is crucial to the whole of his theory, 
and lies at the core of his criticism of Western metaphysics. Derrida’s 
goal is not a reversal of priorities – namely, the prioritizing of writing 
over speech – but a critique of the whole of Western metaphysics 
that he understands as ‘logocentric’. As Gayatri Spivak points out in 
her introduction to Of Grammatology, the term ‘writing’ is used by 
Derrida to name a whole strategy of investigation, not merely 
‘writing in the narrow sense’ as a kind of notation on a material 
support (Derrida, 1976: lxix). Thus, Derrida writes Of 
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Grammatology not to pursue a mere valorisation of writing over 
speech, but to present the repression of writing ‘in the narrow sense’, 
as a symptom of logocentrism that forbids us to recognize that 
everything is pervaded by the structure of ‘writing in general’ – that 
is, an eternal escaping of the ‘thing itself’.11
 
 Derrida argues that 
speech too is structured like writing. There is no structural 
distinction between writing and speech – except that, in the history 
of metaphysics, writing has been repressed and read as a surrogate of 
speech. 
In the chapter ‘The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing’ 
in Of Grammatology Derrida maintains that today writing can no 
longer be thought as ‘a particular, derivative, auxiliary form of 
language in general’, or as ‘an exterior surface, the insubstantial 
double of a major signifier, the signifier of the signifier’ (1976: 7). 
Making writing instrumental is a move of Western metaphysics, and 
it is paired with the notion of speech as fully present. From this 
perspective, writing is seen as an interpretation of original speech, as 
technology in the service of language. However, Derrida suggests 
that language could only be a ‘mode’ or an aspect of writing.  
 
Derrida’s questioning of logocentrism is inseparable from his 
questioning of the instrumental conception of technology. In 
Mémoires: for Paul de Man he states that ‘[t]here is no 
deconstruction which does not … begin by calling again into 
question the dissociation between thought and technology, 
especially when it has a hierarchical vocation, however secret, subtle, 
sublime or denied it may be’ (Derrida, 1986: 108). Thus, once again, 
Derrida makes it explicit that the dissociation between thought and 
technology is – as is every other binary opposition – hierarchical, 
since it implies the devaluation of one of the two terms of the binary: 
in this case, technology.  For this reason Clark (2000) suggests that 
‘originary technicity’ can be considered another name for Derrida’s 
‘writing in the general sense’. As Derrida states in Of Grammatology: 
‘Writing is not an auxiliary in the service of science – and possibly its 
object – but first, as Husserl in particular points out in The Origin of 
Geometry, the condition of the possibility of ideal objects and 
therefore of scientific objectivity. Before being its object, writing is 
the condition of the episteme’ (Derrida 1976: 27). 
 
This passage is crucial for clarifying the relationship that Derrida 
establishes between writing and thought, and ultimately for his 
understanding of technology as constitutive of the human. As Clark 
explains, for Derrida ‘writing enregisters the past in a way that 
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produces a new relation to the present and the future, which may 
now be conceived within the horizon of an historical temporality, 
and as an element of ideality’ (2000: 241). Thus, the written mark 
gives us the possibility of preserving a trace of the past and enables 
us to acquire a sense of time. Clearly Derrida views writing – 
understood here as technology, or the technological capacity of 
registering the past – as a constitutive condition of thought. 
Consequently, technology cannot be understood through the 
opposition between technê and epistêmê, because it precedes and 
enables such an opposition. But what would all this mean for the 
digital humanities? To be more specific, in what way would the 
reformulation of ‘originary technicity’ in terms of Derrida’s ‘writing 
in general’ advance our understanding of the digital and of its 
relations with the humanities? In order to start addressing both of 
these questions, it is useful to examine Derrida’s rereading of Leroi-
Gourhan’s thought in Of Grammatology. Famously, in this work 
Derrida expressly highlights how the reconceptualization of the 
Western tradition of thought is particularly urgent today. Such a 
rethinking is what Derrida famously calls ‘the end of the book’, or 
the end of linear writing. According to Derrida, we are suspended 
today between two eras of writing – and this is why we can also 
reread our past in a new way.  
 
For Derrida, Leroi-Gourhan has shown in Le geste et la parole that 
the historical perspective that associates humanity with the 
emergence of writing (and therefore excludes peoples ‘without 
writing’ from history) is profoundly ethnocentric. In fact, it 
shortsightedly denies the characteristic of humanity to peoples who 
do not actually lack ‘writing’, but only ‘a certain type of writing’ 
(Derrida 1976: 83) – that is, alphabetic writing. To explain this 
point Derrida draws on Leroi-Gourhan’s concept of ‘linearization’. 
For Leroi-Gourhan the emergence of alphabetic writing must be 
understood as a process of linearization (Leroi-Gourhan, 1993: 
190). In his analysis of the emergence of graphism, Leroi-Gourhan 
emphasises what he considers to be the underestimated link 
between figurative art and writing. ‘[I]n its origins’, he states, 
‘figurative art was directly linked with language and was much closer 
to writing (in the broadest sense) than to what we understand by a 
work of art’ (190). Given the difficulty of separating primitive 
figurative art from language, he proposes the name ‘picto-
ideography’ for this general figurative mindframe. Yet he is very clear 
that such a mindframe does not correspond to writing ‘in its infancy’ 
(195). Such an interpretation would amount to applying to the 
study of graphism a mentality influenced by four thousand years of 
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alphabetic writing – something that linguists have often done, for 
instance, when studying pictograms. But ‘picto-ideography’ signals 
an originary independence of graphism from the mental attitude 
that constitutes the basis of what Leroi-Gourhan calls ‘linearization’.  
 
To understand the concept of linearization better, one must start 
from Leroi-Gourhan’s concept of language as a ‘world of symbols’ 
that ‘parallels the real world and provides us with our means of 
coming to grips with reality’ (195). For Leroi-Gourhan graphism is 
not dependent on spoken language, although the two belong to the 
same realm. Leroi-Gourhan views the emergence of alphabetic 
writing as associated with the technoeconomic development of the 
Mediterranean and European group of civilizations. At a certain 
point in time during this process writing became subordinated to 
spoken language. Before that, Leroi-Gourhan states, the hand had its 
own language, which was sight-related, while the face possessed 
another one, which was related to hearing. He explains: 
 
At the linear graphism stage that characterizes 
writing, the relationship between the two fields 
undergoes yet another development. Written 
language, phoneticized and linear in space, 
becomes completely subordinated to spoken 
language, which is phonetic and linear in time. 
The dualism between graphic and verbal 
disappears, and the whole of human linguistic 
apparatus becomes a single instrument for 
expressing and preserving thought – which itself is 
channelled increasingly toward reasoning. (210) 
 
By becoming a means for the phonetic recording of speech, writing 
becomes a technology. It is actually placed at the level of the tool, or 
of ‘technology’ in its instrumental sense. As a tool, its efficiency 
becomes proportional to what Leroi-Gourhan views as a 
‘constriction’ of its figurative force, pursued precisely through an 
increasing linearization of symbols. Leroi-Gourhan calls this process 
‘the adoption of a regimented form of writing’ that opens the way ‘to 
the unrestrained development of a technical utilitarianism’ (212). 
 
Expanding on Leroi-Gourhan’s view of phonetic writing as ‘rooted 
in a past of nonlinear writing’, and on the concept of the 
linearization of writing as the victory of ‘the irreversible temporality 
of sound’, Derrida relates the emergence of phonetic writing to a 
linear understanding of time and history (Derrida, 1976: 85). For 
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him linearization is nothing but the constitution of the ‘line’ as a 
norm, a model – and yet, one must keep in mind that the line is just a 
model, however privileged. The linear conception of writing implies 
a linear conception of time – that is, a conception of time as 
homogeneous and involved in a continuous movement, be it straight 
or circular. Derrida draws on Heidegger’s argument that this 
conception of time characterizes all ontology from Aristotle to 
Hegel – that is, all Western thought.  Therefore, and this is the main 
point of Derrida’s thesis, ‘the meditation upon writing and the 
deconstruction of the history of philosophy become inseparable’ 
(86). 
 
However simplified, this reconstruction of Derrida’s argument 
demonstrates how, in his rereading of Leroi-Gourhan’s theory, 
Derrida understands the relationship of the human with writing and 
with technology as constitutive of the human, rather than 
instrumental. Writing has become what it is through a process of 
linearization – that is, by conforming to the model of the line – and 
in doing so it has become instrumental to speech. Since the model of 
the line also characterizes the idea of time in Western thought, 
questioning the idea of language as linear implies questioning the 
role of the line as a model, and thus the concept of time as modelled 
on the line. It also implies questioning the foundations of Western 
thought (by means of a strategy of investigation that, as we have 
seen, Derrida names ‘writing in general’, or ‘writing in the broader 
sense’). At this point it becomes clear why, if we follow Derrida’s 
reworking of the concept of originary technicity, a new 
understanding of technology (as intimately related to language and 
writing) entails a rethinking of Western philosophy – ambitious as 
this task may be. It is worth noting here that in Of Grammatology 
Derrida expressly highlights how the reconceptualization of the 
Western tradition of thought is particularly urgent today. Actually, 
the ‘uneasiness’ of philosophy in the past century is due to an 
increasing destabilization of the model of the line. He states that 
what is thought today cannot be written in a book – that is, it cannot 
be thought through with a linear model – any more than 
contemporary mathematics can be taught with an abacus (87). This 
inadequacy does not just apply to the current moment in time, but it 
comes to the fore today more clearly than ever. Derrida writes: 
 
The history of writing is erected [by Leroi-
Gourhan] on the base of the history of the 
grammé as an adventure of relationships between 
the face and the hand. Here, by a precaution 
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whose schema we must constantly repeat, let us 
specify that the history of writing is not explained 
by what we believe we know of the face and the 
hand, of the glance, of the spoken word, and of the 
gesture. We must, on the contrary, disturb this 
familiar knowledge, and awaken a meaning of 
hand and face in terms of that history. (1976: 84) 
 
For Derrida what is most relevant in Leroi-Gourhan’s history of 
writing is that it problematizes our conception of the human (‘what 
we believe we know of the face and the hand’). Yet the focus of 
Derrida’s work is not the concrete analysis of historical systems of 
writing, since, as we have seen, he differentiates ‘writing in general’ 
from any such system. With regard to my investigation of the digital 
humanities, then, Derrida’s understanding of what Clark calls 
‘originary technicity’ has two important implications. On the one 
hand, it confirms the fundamental relationship between technology 
and the human, and it supports the need for a radical questioning of 
both concepts in the digital humanities. On the other hand, Derrida 
leaves open the question of how to investigate a historically specific 
technology without losing its significance for a radical rethinking of 
the relationship between technology and the human. It is actually 
Stiegler’s rereading of Derrida’s thought in Technics and Time that 
allows for such an investigation. Let me now analyze this point a 
little further. 
 
As Stiegler emphasizes, the emergence of the technique of linear 
writing radically transforms the modes of cultural transmission from 
generation to generation. In fact, from the point of view of Greek 
pre-Socratic thought, which does not presume the immortality of 
the soul, the dead can nevertheless return as ghosts that transmit an 
inheritance, and such inheritance is deemed to come from a spirit 
(esprit) that crosses generations. This is the pre-Socratic image of 
cultural transmission. In contrast, the appearance of linear writing 
allows for the transmission of culture ‘as a unified spirit, precisely 
through the unification of language enabled by literalization’ 
(1998a: 154). Drawing on Leroi-Gourhan’s and Derrida’s thought, 
Stiegler insists that the emergence of the model of the line has 
changed both the transmission of culture and the modes of thought. 
 
According to Stiegler, the Sophists themselves are a by-product of 
this process. The years between the seventh and the fifth century 
BCE are witness to the arrival of the grammatists, the masters of 
letters, and later on of the Sophists, who ‘go on systematically to 
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develop a technique of language that quickly acquires a critical 
dimension, in so far as this technique of developed language will in 
turn engender a moral crisis’ (155). Thus, sophistry is not an oral 
technique; rather, it presupposes writing.12
 
 Accordingly, Plato 
criticizes the Sophists because they manage to speak well, ‘but they 
learn everything by heart, by means of this techno-logical 
“hypomnesis” that is logography, the preliminary writing out of 
speeches. It is because writing exists that the sophists can learn the 
apparently “oral” technique of language that is rhetorical 
construction’ (155). In the Ion Plato even makes a connection 
between poets and Sophists, claiming that they work along the same 
lines of falsehood: ‘[s]ophists, poets, are only liars, that is to say, 
technicians’ (155). This powerful image of the technician as a liar 
constitutes the summation of Plato’s devaluation of technology and 
writing. 
To summarize, Stiegler points out that, on the one hand, the 
question of technology, considered as the object of repression, ‘is a 
question that emerges with and by its denunciation by Plato’ (155). 
It arises ‘above all as a denial, and in this sense therefore as a kind of 
forgetting’ – and this is quite paradoxical, since in Phaedrus what 
Plato blames technology for is precisely its power of forgetting 
(155). On the other hand, it can be said that the question of 
technology appears well before Plato: as we have just seen, it arises 
in the context of the transformation of the Greek cities, associated 
with the development of navigation, money, and above all 
mnemotechnics, that is to say of technologies capable of 
transforming the conditions of social and political life, and of 
thought. Ultimately, technê and epistêmê – that is, knowledge and 
technology – share a relationship with writing, the fundamental 
mnemotechnics. In turn, mnemotechnics, and technology in 
general, both reveal a constitutive connection with temporality.  
 
Stiegler’s understanding of the transformation of technology in time 
is crucially related to his ‘displacement’ of deconstruction that also 
results in his break with Heidegger (Hansen, 2003: non-pag.). 
Stiegler explains: 
 
Let’s say, for example, that one night I write the 
sentence: ‘it is dark’. I then reread this sentence 
twelve hours later and I say to myself: hang on, it’s 
not dark, it’s light. I have entered into the 
dialectic. What is to be done here? … That which 
makes consciousness be self-consciousness (i.e. 
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consciousness that is conscious of contradiction 
with itself) is the fact that consciousness is 
capable of externalising itself. (Stiegler, 2003b: 
163) 
 
This passage is extremely important because it reformulates the 
concept of the technical constitution of consciousness that Clark 
explores in his analysis of The Turing Option (Clark, 2000: 240). 
Here what Stiegler – and Leroi-Gourhan before him – calls 
‘exteriorization’ (which constitutes the basis of self-consciousness) 
is clearly pursued through writing. One writes ‘it is dark’, and, when 
one rereads the note twelve hours later, it is light. This produces, as 
Stiegler himself further clarifies, ‘a contradiction between times’, 
namely the time of consciousness when one wrote this and the time 
of consciousness when one reads this. Yet, one still has the same 
consciousness, which is therefore ‘put in crisis’ (Stiegler, 2003b: 
163), and this crisis in turn raises self-awareness. The act of 
inscription – that is, of exteriorization – ultimately constitutes 
interiority, which does not precede exteriority, and vice versa. As I 
have explained earlier, for Stiegler (again drawing on Leroi-
Gourhan) the process of exteriorization constitutes the foundation 
of temporality, of language and of technical production, and requires 
a basic neurological ‘competence’ – that is, ‘a level of suitable 
cortical and subcortical organization’ (164).  
 
This is Stiegler’s fundamental point of departure from Derrida’s 
theory. Through this departure he lays the foundation for the 
concrete study of historically specific technologies as fundamental to 
the understanding of the constitutive relationship between 
technology and the human. To clarify this point, it is now worth 
examining Stiegler’s interpretation of the myth of Prometheus and 
Epimetheus briefly. According to the myth, Zeus gives Prometheus 
the task of distributing qualities and powers to the living creatures, 
but Prometheus leaves it to his twin brother Epimetheus to act in his 
place. Epimetheus hands out all the qualities to the living and forgets 
to keep at least one for the human being. Human beings therefore 
appear here as characterized by a ‘lack of quality’ (Stiegler, 2003b: 
156). Stiegler comments that the human being is ‘a being by default, 
a being marked by its own original flaw or lack, that is to say afflicted 
with an original handicap’ (156). For this reason, Prometheus 
decides to steal technology – that is, fire – and gives it to human 
beings, in order to enable them to invent artefacts and to become 
capable of developing all qualities. With the gift of technology, a 
problem arises: mortals cannot agree on how to use artefacts, and 
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consequently start fighting and destroying each other. In Stiegler’s 
words, ‘[t]hey are put in charge of their own fate, but nothing tells 
them what this fate is, because the lack [défaut] of origin is also a 
lack of purpose or end’ (156). Stiegler’s reworking of the myth 
clearly demonstrates how for him technology raises the problem of 
decision, and how this encounter of the human with decision in turn 
constitutes time  – or rather, what Stiegler calls ‘technical time’. 
Technical time emerges because human beings experience their 
capacity for making a difference in time through decisions. 
Temporality is precisely this opening of the possibility of a decision, 
which is also the possibility of creating the unpredictable, the new. 
 
It is for this very reason that the historical specificity of technology is 
central to Stiegler’s thought. The human capability of deciding ‘what 
to become’ constitutes temporality. Moreover, human prostheticity – 
that is, the fact that human beings, to survive, require non-living 
organs such as houses, clothes, sharpened flints, and all that Stiegler 
calls ‘organized inorganic matter’ –- forms the basis for memory, or, 
more specifically, , for technical memory. Unlike genetic and 
individual memory, technical memory coincides with the process of 
exteriorization that ‘enables the transmission of the individual 
experience of people from generation to generation, something 
inconceivable in animality’ (159). This inherited experience is what 
Stiegler calls ‘the world’ – that is, a world that is always already 
haunted by ‘spirits’ in the pre-Socratic sense, always already 
constructed by the memories of others.  
 
I want to highlight here how Stiegler’s approach is extremely helpful 
in order to contextualize the necessity of making decisions about 
technology in the perspective of the digital humanities. In fact, such 
decisions do not just affect technology; they also change our 
experience of time, our modes of thought and, ultimately, our 
understanding of what it means to be human. If understood as 
originary, technology constitutes our sense of time – or rather, we 
only gain a sense of time and memory, and therefore of who we are, 
through technology. In turn, every change in technology changes 
our sense of time, and this then changes the meaning that we give to 
the fact of being human.  
 
To recap, what I have attempted to show here is that the digital 
humanities must think digitality critically, first of all by questioning 
the assumptions of rationality that are at the foundation of digitality. 
The model(s) of rationality on which digital technologies are based 
cannot be ‘imported’ unquestioningly into the humanities. The 
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same is true for the idea of instrumentality. Indeed, on the one hand 
the digital humanities are the ideal place to investigate the mutual 
co-constitution of technology and the human. The originary 
connection between technology and language places technology at 
the core of the humanities. On the other hand, the specificities of 
singular encounters between  instances of digital technologies and 
instances of the humanities must be investigated. To paraphrase 
Gary Hall, the digital humanities are performed whenever the 
humanities engage with some instances of digitality – be it an open 
access database, a blog, or an algorithm (Hall, 2007). 
 
Such a radical engagement with digitality is not meant to interrupt 
the humanities’ ongoing experimentation with digitality. However, it 
does call for critical reflection on digitality (for instance, on the 
conceptual foundations of the algorithms we use) while we 
experiment with it. Even more importantly, in a world in which the 
university is becoming more and more just another knowledge-
based organization governed by rules of efficiency and flexibility, the 
digital humanities might become the ideal context in which to 
reaffirm the role of the university as a public sphere. Questioning 
instrumentality is an essential step toward questioning the idea of 
knowledge as a commodity, and of ‘the neoliberal logic that views 
schools as malls, students as consumers, and faculty as 
entrepreneurs’ (Giroux, 2010: non-pag.). If academic labour must 
resist instrumentality in order to remain political, then the digital 
humanities become an ideal place for a persistent critique of all 
instrumental modes of thinking. 
 
                                               
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 For the purpose of this article I understand the digital humanities 
as embracing all those scholarly activities that involve using 
computational techniques and methodologies (image processing, 
data visualisation, network analysis) to produce new ways of 
approaching humanities texts as well as the practices of being 
engaged in processes of digital media production (creating 
interactive electronic literature, or building online databases and 
wikis). See Hall’s article in this issue. 
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2 Liu’s expression ‘discourse network 2000’ draws on Friedrich 
Kittler’s concept of the ‘discourse network’, by which Kittler means 
‘the network of technologies and institutions that allow a given 
culture to select, store and process relevant data’ (Kittler 1990: 
369). ‘Discursive networks 2000’ is the name that Liu gives to the 
discursive circuit producing ‘encoded or structured discourse, in the 
technical sense of digital text encoding and structured markup’ (Liu 
2008: 210). 
 
3 The term ‘technics’ belongs to Stiegler’s partially Heideggerian 
philosophical vocabulary. I take it here as a synonym for what we 
commonly refer to as ‘technology’. 
 
4 For more on this, see Nicomachean Ethics 6, 3-4 (Aristotle, 1984).  
 
5 During the ascent of Nazism in Germany, Husserl conceptualized 
the emergence of algebra (which had been ongoing since Galileo’s 
times) as a technique of calculation that emptied geometry of its 
visual content. ‘In algebraic calculation,’ he wrote, ‘one lets 
geometric signification recede into the background as a matter of 
course, indeed one drops it altogether; one calculates, remembering 
only at the end that the numbers signify magnitudes’ (Husserl, 
1970: 44-45). According to Husserl, by becoming viable to 
calculation, geometry renounces its capacity of visualizing 
geometrical shapes – or, in Husserl’s terms, ‘spatio-temporal 
idealities’ (41). Therefore, as Stiegler comments, ‘the technicization 
of science constitutes its eidetic blinding’ (Stiegler, 1998a: 3). I want 
to point out here how the concept of ‘calculation’ is a constitutive 
part of the concept of instrumentality. For Husserl calculation seems 
to be the equivalent of formalization and algebra, as the technique of 
calculation is nothing but a formalism that allows us to manipulate 
numerical configurations and to forget their visual meaning. The 
emphasis here is not on the supposedly ‘mechanical’ character of 
calculation; on the contrary, Husserl highlights the fact that algebra 
still makes geometrical discoveries possible. Rather, the emphasis is 
on the forgetting of what Husserl understands as the visual meaning 
of geometry. 
 
6 See Phaedrus 275 ff. (Plato, 1989). 
 
7 I quote here from the English translation of Chapter 4 of Stiegler’s 
La technique et le temps 3. Le temps du cinéma et la question du mal-être 
(2001a), published in Culture Machine (Stiegler, 2003a). Stiegler’s 
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original take on the correlation between the human and the 
technological informs his rereading of Heidegger, as well as his 
divergence from Derrida’s own reworking of Heidegger (Hansen, 
2004). 
 
8 Such an experience of the self is what philosophers have called ‘self-
affection’ (Kant) or - and this is particularly important in Stiegler’s 
thought, as I will show in a moment - ‘internal time-consciousness’ 
(Husserl). 
 
9 Software has never been univocally defined by any disciplinary 
field. However, the definition of software provided by Software 
Engineering is a very general one – as it can be expected from a 
discipline that was established in the late 1960s with the purpose of 
helping programmers design software cost-effectively, regardless of 
the specific applications and programming languages they were 
working with. 
 
10 It must be noticed that, in the third volume of Technics and Time, 
Stiegler speaks of the contemporary convergence between technics 
and mnemotechnics in the broad sense of the convergence of 
technologies of production with information and communication 
technologies. However, for him information and communication 
technologies undoubtedly fall under the rubric of mnemotechnics – 
or technology that has recording as its primary aim. I want to argue 
that, ultimately, in order to distinguish between technics and 
mnemotechnics, Stiegler resorts to the concept of the aim (or the 
end) of technology, therefore seemingly falling back into the 
instrumental conception of technology – which obviously 
contradicts his understanding of technology as originary. 
 
11 On the other hand, in the section of Of Grammatology about Lévi-
Strauss, Derrida (1976) suggests that no definite distinction 
between writing in the ‘narrow’ and the ‘general’ sense can be traced, 
for one slips into the other.  
 
12 Stiegler’s assertion mirrors Derrida’s argument that we need to 
have a sense of writing in order to have a sense of orality. 
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